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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of the Internet has brought a global expansion to the 
communication era. In this globalization advent, the importance of the Internet has 
grown tremendously. This growth has continued and driven by the ever great 
online piles of information, electronic commerce, entertainment and social 
networking. The Internet basically creates a new layer of functionality and usage in 
the era of technology. This motivated world-class leading organizations such as 
Google, Yahoo, eBay, and Amazon to utilize the Internet in providing their day-to-
day services [7] [44] [47]. 
The domain name system (DNS) plays a vital role in the Internet 
connectivity by converting domain names into IP addresses that can be used by 
network devices. The domain name space consists of a tree of domain names. Each 
node or leaf in the tree has zero or more resource records, which hold information 
associated with the domain name. The tree sub-divides into zones beginning at the 
root zone. The DNS consists of a hierarchy of DNS servers with 13 root 
nameservers at the top of the hierarchy. The IP addresses of the 13 root 
nameservers are hard coded in root hints file in every recursive or caching DNS 
server [37] [22]. The second important type of name servers is the Top Level 
Domain (TLD) which is divided into two categories: the generic TLDs (gTLDs) and 
the country code TLDs (ccTLDs). From TLDs, the rest of the DNS servers extend in 
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tree-structure into multiple zones [22] [2]. The DNS server that is responsible for 
adding, removing, or updating the resource records that belong to its zone is called 
an authoritative name server. 
DNS provides a critical and a core service and its absence has a severe 
impact on other application-layer protocols such as HTTP, FTP, and SMTP. 
Therefore, for any organization, DNS provides a vital service without which the 
organization is deemed isolated and hence blocked from using Internet services.   
With the current DNS structure, there is no centralized source of data 
containing all DNS information; rather it is distributed over the authoritative 
servers in each domain. The authoritative servers for each level domain are 
required to store the information about the next level domain. For example, root 
servers store the information about all gTLD and cc-TLD servers and so on. 
Resolving queries require traversing through multiple servers to reach the 
authoritative server of the queried host name which can answer with the IP 
address. The design of the DNS is hierarchal and queries follow the hierarchal path 
starting from the root. Usually at the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), there are 
caching DNS servers to cache frequently queried host names to reduce the traffic 
going to the Internet and also to enhance the response time. When a client requests 
to resolve a host name, it forwards the request to the local ISP caching DNS. If the 
answer is already cached, then the local DNS server answers directly from the 
cache. Otherwise, the local DNS server fetches the answer from the authoritative 
DNS server. To know the authoritative DNS server of the requested host, the local 
DNS server contacts any root DNS server.  The root DNS server will respond with 
3 
 
the TLD server responsible for the TLD domain in the host name. The TLD server 
will also answer with the responsible of the organization domain or the next TLD 
authoritative server depending on the requested host name. The process is 
repeated until the authoritative DNS server is reached and answers with the IP 
address or a failure response is received from any of the contacted servers. While 
the local ISP DNS server uses its cache to answer DNS queries, it is also possible 
that an intermediate DNS server resolves the query from cache [22]. 
To illustrate the concept of resolving DNS queries, we provide the following 
example as shown in Figure ‎1.1 and Figure ‎1.2. In this example, we assume that the 
local caching DNS server is contacting all authoritative DNS servers for each 
domain to resolve the host name. However, in reality the communication by the 
caching servers is not always carried out that way, because there are two types of 
DNS queries namely, recursive and iterative. Typically, clients submit recursive 
queries and depending on the configuration of the authoritative DNS servers, the 
query might be forwarded iteratively or recursively. The difference between 
recursive and iterative queries is that servers accepting recursive requests should 
either answer with the IP address or a failure. While using iterative queries, the 
initiator will carry the subsequent interactions with all authoritative DNS servers 
based on the information it receives. Figure ‎1.1 shows an example of resolving the 
host name “www.google.com” with recursive DNS lookup, while Figure ‎1.2 shows 




Figure ‎1.1: An example of resolving the host name “www.google.com” with recursive DNS 
lookup. 
 
Figure ‎1.2: Iterative DNS lookup with first query being recursive while resolving the host 
name “www.google.com”. 
1.1. Domain Name System Evolution 
At the start of the Internet, the size of the network was limited and a small 
database can contain the table of all hostnames to IP entries. To resolve a 
hostname, a simple solution was implemented to satisfy the needs at that time. It 
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was simply storing the database on each host. Whenever there is a request to 
initiate a communication with a remote host, the name is first resolved by matching 
the host name with the entries in the local database and fetching the IP address as 
shown in Figure ‎1.3. But with the growth of the network, this solution did not scale. 
Large network size indicates more possibility of nodes updating their IP addresses 
and hence increased number of obsolete records in the database. Consequently, this 
results in frequent manual updates to the database.  To eliminate this tremendous 
overhead of frequent and repetitive manual process, a centralized server was 
hosting the DNS database and clients download the database whenever they need 
as shown in Figure ‎1.4 [28] [2]. 
 
Figure ‎1.3: Manual installation of the mapping file on hosts. 
With further increase in the network size, other problems start to surface. 
First, the rate of hosts updating their IP addresses was large, resulting in many 
obsolete entries in the database in a short period of time. Second, the database size 
started to increase rapidly and that negatively affected the time it takes the clients 
to download the database.  Third, the server hosting the database got overloaded 
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causing increased response time. Fourth, the downloaded database consumed large 
storage, at the client side, while only small part of the database is being utilized. [2] 
 
Figure ‎1.4: Host to IP mapping file is hosted on one server and clients download it locally to 
resolve hostnames. 
1.2. Current Domain Name System Structure 
Newer design proposals were introduced to restructure the DNS. These DNS 
design proposals, after many enhancements resulted in the current DNS structure 
[2]. Currently, DNS is structured as a hieratical tree. Each node of the tree is either a 
branch to a new level or a leaf node. The root node is the root domain and it is 
represented by an empty string in the host name. It consists of root DNS servers. 
There are 13 root DNS servers named with [a to m].root-servers.net. However there 
are many replicas which are distributed globally as anycast root servers. Anycast 
servers  are servers with the same IP address distributed over many locations and 
the packets targeting the IP address will be directed to the nearest topologically 
server. The root zone is controlled by United States Department of Commerce 
(USDC). Any changes to this zone require approval from USDC. The next level in the 
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DNS hierarchy tree is the top-level domain (TLD). It consists of over 300 domains 
including country code top-level domains (cc-TLD). Example of general top level 
domains are com (commercial), net (network) and edu (education). Examples of 
country code top level domains are sa for Saudi Arabia and ae for Arab Emirates. 
The next level is the second level domain which is registered to organizations such 
as King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM). The next level is the 
fourth level and it can be a sub-domain within an organization and can be used to 
refer to different parts of the organization such as departments. Also this level can 
be the last part of the hostname string which is the name of the leaf node. For 
example, scholar.google.com is the full host name and scholar is the name of the 
host in Google organization. Figure ‎1.5 shows an example of the DNS tree.  It should 
be noted that the number of domains in a host name is not limited to 4 domains 
only, it can have larger number of domains but the host name must not exceed the 
maximum number of 255 characters including the dots. 
 
Figure ‎1.5: DNS tree 
""
ROOT




www mail www gcmd
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While DNS main function is resolving host name to IP address, it is also 
being utilized to act as a load balancer to share the load between servers. Load 
balancing is simply achieved by having multiple IP addresses for the same host 
name. Every time the domain name replies to client requests, it replies with 
different IP address. However, this is not always an effective way to load balance 
the requests due to caching [9]. A clients’ request goes first to the clients’ local DNS. 
If the request is cached then the local DNS will reply from the cached data. 
Otherwise, it will fetch the data from the domain server and will respond to the 
client with the response. Also, a cached copy of the answer will be stored on the 
caching server. As such, caching DNS servers will have different round robin cycles 
resulting in more requests targeting some servers than others, ending up with 
servers not receiving equal loads. Solutions attempted to omit cache effect by 
specifying zero time-to-live (TTL) value. Each entry in the DNS has TTL value which 
indicates the time limit for the entry to be used before it expires. With zero TTL 
value, cached entries will be immediately obsolete. But even with this solution, 
some caching DNS has a predefined minimum TTL value for all records and will not 
adhere to the specified TTL by the domain server making this solution ineffective. 
DNS also requires specifying primary and backup servers for the domain 
name. In case one fails the other can handle the requests. Web servers for example 
can take advantage of this by acting as the primary name server for its own 
hostname. If the web server goes down then the client request for web server’s IP 
address will get no answer. The client will initiate new request to the backup server 
which will respond with the IP address of the second web server and ending up 
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with a successful request. All of this process is hidden for the end user in a way that 
he/she will not notice any change in the service as if the response was fetched from 
the primary server [9]. 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two discusses the 
motivation of this research and sheds light on the problem statement. Chapter 
three presents the state-of-the-art related work to the denial of service attacks 
against DNS and their general solutions. For completeness and clarity purposes, we 
outline the Chord protocol in chapter four. In chapter five, a detailed explanation of 
the proposed solution is presented with a discussion of the solution advantages. 
The structure of the implemented simulation is explained in chapter six.  Chapter 
six also provides verification and correctness studies of our simulator. Chapter 
seven discusses the simulation results of the proposed solution while chapter eight 




CHAPTER 2  
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this thesis, we were motivated by the fact that DNS is vulnerable to 
blockage while it is a critical system for the Internet survival. As discussed in the 
literature [14] [30] [36] [45], DNS service can be interrupted by a range of attacks 
such as misconfiguration, denial of service (DoS), cache poisoning, and 
compromised data. To address such attacks, researches put forward various 
solutions spanning from using DNS security extensions [24] [35], using “Anycast 
routing” [37], manipulating the Time-To-Live (TTL) value [34], and increasing the 
efficiency of DNS caching [33].  
The problem of the DNS blockage results in halting the services provided by 
the DNS system including resolving host names to IP addresses. The blockage can 
happen in two ways, by DoS attacks or by the DNS higher nameservers. The higher 
nameservers have the authority to reject queries initiated by clients [37] [38] and 
with the current DNS design the resolution process can be broken intentionally 
through those servers for political reasons.  The two vulnerabilities exist because 
DNS structures servers in a hierarchal manner and the job of the root servers is 
routing DNS requests to the next level which is the top level domain servers. The 
top level domain servers will also route the requests to the next level and this 
process is repeated until the requests reach a domain name server which in turn 
answers the request. If the request is not directed by root DNS servers at the start 
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of the resolution process, then it will turn out with no answer. There were two 
incidents where a number of root DNS systems were attacked resulting in an 
outage of their service [38]. That led to unusable Internet with no accessible 
service. Prior to these incidents, an incident due to a technical problem in seven of 
the root DNS servers resulted in one day Internet outage [38]. In addition to these 
incidents, the resolvers need to go through the higher nameserves (i.e., root and/or 
TLDs) to resolve the client’s request. This raises the level of risk as these higher 
nameservers can stop serving specific region for political or malicious reasons [13] 
[29] [31] [36] [45]. Although the idea of malicious and hence intentional denial of 
service by higher nameservers seems unlikely at first, there are several reasons 
that may force a root nameserver to become malicious and perform Internet access 
denial against a specific organization or country. For example, Internet access 
denial can be driven by political motivations, as governments may force higher 
nameservers to block Internet access to a specific region or country in an attempt 
to establish an Internet embargo on the targeted region. Many large services and 
networks have been attacked recently for political motivations. On December 2009, 
Gmail, for example, had many attacks targeting email accounts of Chinese human 
rights activists [16] [43]. Twitter, a popular social network, has also been attacked 
during 2009 by hackers from Iran [1]. Another prime example of political 
motivations to deny Internet access to an organization are the recent attempts by 
many governments to pressure service providers (e.g., DNS service) to block access 
to WikiLeaks [3] [4]‎. Such types of attacks are driven by political motives.  
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2.1. Thesis Contribution 
 Resolve DNS blockage problem caused by the international Internet service 
provider. 
 Restructure DNS to two levels Peer-to-Peer overlay networks. 
 Implement a recursive Chord peer-to-peer simulator with Java and comparing 







CHAPTER 3  
RELATED WORK 
This chapter will explore some of the weaknesses in the current DNS system 
and some of the proposed solutions to Denial of Service attack against DNS as well 
as the general architecture to tackle DoS and DDoS attack. For the purpose of clarity 
and completion, we included in section 3.3 a discussion about Chord peer-to-peer 
protocol with some of the proposed enhancements because it is related to our 
work. 
3.1. DNS Weaknesses 
DoS and DDoS are two forms of attacks that aim to disable services provided 
on the Internet by saturating a targeted service with huge amount requests so it 
cannot respond to legitimate requests. With the new technologies, clients are 
becoming more powerful increasing the threat for all published services [40] [43]. 
As mentioned, two outage incidents of DNS service were caused by DDoS attacks. 
To find the threat of this type of attack, several studies and measures have been 
conducted [38]. In 2001, different measurements in different times have been 
performed in the ‘f’ root server ‘f.root-servers.net’ and the results show surprising 
numbers. In all of the results, 60-85% of the received queries were repeated from 
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the same hosts and more than 14% of the queries were violating DNS standards. 
Many requests were unanswerable, like the requester IP address is in the private 
address space (ex, 10.*, 192.168.*) or asking for invalid top-level-domain. Also, the 
DNS servers are utilized to act as a reflector for DoS attacks by spoofing the source 
IP address to be the victim machine. Also, the study shows some hosts were trying 
to update the root DNS server IP address and sending up to 15000 update requests 
within one day. The statistics in one of the measures showed 20% out of 10 
millions queries were for invalid TLD and 16.5% of the servers just asking for 
invalid queries. This illustrates how the DoS and DDoS attack is all the time active 
and consuming servers’ resources [26]. 
In 2002, different measures were done at the clients’ side in different 
locations. The study focuses on the response time and considers only non-cached 
names in collected statistics as they experience the longest response time. The 
results show a wide range in the response time which varies from 0.95 seconds to 
2.31 seconds. gTLD servers account for 13.9% to 28.9% of the response time and 
they are queried at 60% of the lookup at each site. Root DNS servers have a very 
low response time and account for 1.5% to 3.4% of the response time. They are 
queried during 7% of the lookups at each site. The response time is found to be 
effected by two factors, i.e., caching and location. The study also collected a large 
number of domain names using Larbin crawler with 8 different starting points. The 
number of collected names is around 100,000 names, and after the filtration of 
invalid names due to typo mistakes and removing duplicate names based on the 
second level domain, the number of names became 14,983. The names then were 
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categorized based on the gTLD and ccTLD and the percentage is shown in Table 
‎3-1. It is clear that the variation is very large between TLDs. [30] 
Table ‎3-1: Domain name samples percentage in TLD 
TLD 
category 












151 others less than 1% each 
 
Jung, Sit, and Balakrishnan performed different measures by collecting 
extensive packet traces to find the effectiveness of caching and to infer different 
DNS usage from the associated TCP packets. The observations found are that one 
quarter of all DNS lookups do not get any answer and at most it requires 2 to 3 
times of retransmission to receive a successful answer. While a lack of answer 
causes a larger number of retransmissions which results in traversing wide area. 
The results also show that small TTL values of A-records does not degrade DNS 
scalability, because the hit rate is almost the same for both small and large TTL 




Figure ‎3.1: Impact of TTL on hit rate with different number of clients sharing the cache 
 
In 2009, RIPE Network Coordination Centre (one of five regional Internet 
registries) reported a case with increase of query load in the k-root, a root DNS 
server, which the center supports. The load was not posing a problem to block the 
traffic and for analysis purposes, all the packets has been collected. However, the 
load was distributed over other replica of the k-root servers to eliminate drops, as 
small drops appeared at the start of the queries load. The reason behind the drops 
is internal bandwidth limitation. Moreover, large amount of queries were 
originating from large network targeting one anycast server making anycast not 
effective as usual. The analysis shows that the load was caused by queries for only 
one hostname which belongs to the .com domain. Tracking the source IP address of 
the queries shows that the top 8 networks querying for the host name are from 
China. Further analysis shows a low number of queries per IP address, which 
makes this incident not accurately to be classified as DDoS attack. Measurements 
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within 30 minutes found that about 60,000 to 65,000 distinct IP addresses are 
sending queries. With this information, the speculation of the cause of traffic load is 
that the queries are either for a misconfigured software that are related to the 
Chinese language or a capability test for a botnet [45]. 
3.2. Solutions to DNS Problems 
DNS attracted many researchers as it is a critical service for the Internet. 
This section will outline some of the proposed solutions to enhance DNS 
robustness. The researches are either proposing a totally new DNS structure or 
proposing some additions to the current DNS system to tackle some of the existing 
issues. Also, many researches have been conducted to find a solution to DoS and 
DDoS attacks, because they are the common type of attacks against services 
published in the Internet.  
3.2.1. DNS Tuning 
Vasilis, Dan, and Lixia found that the existing DNS system can be enhanced 
without making significant changes to design architecture. This can be achieved by 
setting longer time-to-live (TTL) values to some classified DNS records. The 
classification of DNS records depends on how many zone records are queried. This 
is used in different techniques for increasing the TTL value. The techniques are TTL 
Refresh, TTL Renewal, Long TTL, and combination of these. The TTL Refresh 
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technique refreshes the TTL value every time the record is invoked even if it is not 
expired. The TTL Renewal tries to keep the popular records cached by refetching 
and renewing the TTL value just before they expire. The proposed ways of 
determining which records should be renewed are the least recently used (LRU), 
least frequently used (LFU), and adaptive of both of these renewal methods. The 
long TTL technique is making the TTL values long and this can be done by the zone 
administrator. The last is a combination of more than one method to reduce the 
overhead that exists in each.  
The test was made with different techniques and the results show the 
following:  1) TTL Refresh has a better resilience than the existing system. 2) A 
combination of TTL Refresh and Renewal results show that the TTL Refresh with A-
LFU (adaptive least frequently used) has the best result compared with other 
Renewal methods. As an order LRU is the best, then LFU, then A-LRU, and at the last 
is A-LFU.  3) TTL Refresh and Long-TTL provide almost the same resilience as TTL 
Refresh and A-LFU. The value for Long-TTL used is 5 and 7 days while this might 
cause obsolete DNS records. 4) The last technique used in the test is the 
combination of all, TTL Refresh, Renewal, and Long-TTL. The achieved resilience in 
the last test was the best. Even though the results show better resilience to DoS 
attacks than the legacy DNS system, these methods cannot provide resilience like 
the peer-to-peer networks [34]. 
Increasing TTL value will help to withstand the service outage in root DNS 
servers for a short period, but it will also increase the number of obsolete records. 
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Besides, it will not help in case of long time outage and specially the case of the 
intentional disabling of root DNS services. 
3.2.2. Restructuring DNS Solutions 
3.2.2.1. Dynamic Round-Robin Peer-To-Peer (P2P) Domain Name System 
(DNS) 
Fahd [5] developed a solution based on Chord protocol and round robin. The 
solution depends on the current DNS system to resolve all the requests. It responds 
from the cache in case the same query was resolved earlier by a peer before the 
expiration of the record. The query submission to the legacy system is done in 
round robin to achieve good load balance and with only one hop. First, the network 
is constructed as specified in the Chord protocol with minor modification to the 
“find successor” algorithm in order to filter out the blocked peers. Also, the “closest 
predecessor” and “notify neighbors” algorithms have been changed to consider the 
blocked peers. The first will account for the new type of peers, the blocked peers, 
and will deals with them as living peers. The second algorithm will be executed by a 
node once it gets blocked. The peer with the second function will notify its 
neighbors that its status has changed from active to blocked or that it wants to 
leave the network. The round robin has a lookup window to limit the number of 
trials to resolve a query. Introducing the window meant to resolve the large delays 
that might be caused by the blocked or dead nodes in the routing table. The size of 
the window can be ‘one’, which means contacting only the next node to resolve the 
query; and if it fails, the query fails. The window size can go up to the size of the 
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routing table and by increasing window size it would increase the likelihood to 
resolve the query through different node in case the resolution trial with the first 
node fails. With windows size ‘n’ the node tries ‘n’ times to contact different nodes 
sequentially in the routing table before reporting a failed query. The limitation 
mentioned in the study is the network cannot be in the consistent state. In other 
words not all entries in the routing tables will point to the correct nodes and have 
the right node status. This is due to the natural behavior of the peers as they i.e., 
join and leave the network and this limitation is inherited from Chord. The 
simulation results showed that the configuration best performance is to have the 
window size equals to the size of the routing table and in the simulation case of 4 
virtual nodes per real node was the best [5]. It has better performance than the 
pure Chord, however the solution does not utilize the caches and the dependency 
increased on the legacy DNS system. Also, hosts published by the authoritative DNS 
servers in a blocked region are not resolvable outside its region. 
3.2.2.2. The Case for Pushing DNS 
Mark and Adam [19] construct a DNS structure with a goal to have a robust 
DNS System invulnerable to attacks. The DNS servers are peers constructing an 
overlay network distributed over the world at thousands of ISPs distributing DNS 
name server records. This assumes there is a single master DNS organization that 
has the authority to access all the name server records existing in the root zone and 
all the top level domains. This organization should have a public key known by all 
the DNS servers in the peer-to-peer network. The master site takes all the DNS NS 
records, and creates a single file. It then signs this file using its private key, and 
21 
 
distributes the signed file to the peers. When the peers receive this file, they use 
their built-in public key to check the signature on the file. If the signature is valid, 
then the node caches the file and uses the file as a DNS database to answer DNS 
requests. It also passes the exact file to other peers. All nodes will do the same 
processing to end up with the nodes capable of answering the DNS requests.  In 
case there is a node in the network corrupted the file or modified it, other nodes 
will check the signature and refuse to talk to that peer again and will discard the 
received file. The updates to records is designed to be incremental, that is the 
master DNS will regenerate the entire DNS record file weekly and send it to the 
peers in addition to the updated records that are sent hourly [19]. 
The result of the experiment shows that the design is robust against attacks 
and as the number of the learned malicious peers by normal node is less than 30% 
(compared to non-malicious peers) the infrastructure robustness will not be 
degraded [19]. The drawbacks are huge data transfer between peers and also the 
records will be obsolete. Also, having a master DNS organization will introduce the 
same problem as the one that exist, in the current DNS system with the root server 
which will make the organization the targeted point for the attack. 
3.2.2.3. Overlook: Scalable Name Service on an Overlay Network 
Marvin and Michael [21] developed a new DNS system structure utilizing the 
scalability and the fault tolerance of the overlay (Peer-to-Peer). It can support large 
number of clients, and allows large numbers of concurrent lookups for the same 
records while the lookup latencies are measured in seconds. Furthermore, 
hundreds of updated records can be visible to the public within seconds. The 
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overlay network (Peer-to-Peer protocol) selected for the implementation was 
Pastry, while there are others which can be as well used without affecting the 
performance. The main function of the Pastry protocol is that given a request it 
routes the request to the destination home node [21]. 
Pastry network design requires every node in the network to have a unique 
128-bit node Id and the set of existing node Ids must be uniformly distributed. The 
node Id can be generated by hashing the node public key or the IP address. To 
reach the destination, Pastry uses the targeted node Id as an input for nodes in the 
route. Each node that receives the message will look for a destination node Id and 
will send it to the node that is numerically closer to the destination Id.  For a node 
to know which other nodes have ids closer to the destination Id, it should maintain 
a list of nodes with Ids numerically closer to its Id. The list is called the routing 
table and should have at least O(log N) entries, where N is the number of nodes in 
the network. Each entry is a mapping of a node Id to a node’s IP address. With this 
design, it can cost a message to hop through O(log N) to reach its destination node 
which can cause a delay. To reduce the lookup time and the latency resulted due to 
large number of hops, a replica strategy of records is used [21]. 
The testing experiment was done in simulation. The number of stations used 
is 600 in the core network and 60,000 LAN nodes connected to different link 
capacities. The result shows even with only 100Mbps links capacity and system of 
about 10,000 servers the network can have message processing service times of 0.5 
milliseconds, handling request loads of 560,000 requests per second. However, the 
aggregate CPU overhead of processing multiple application-level and the 
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forwarding hops per lookup request makes the contribution of each new server 
adds no value in reducing the lookup latency. Also if a node with low CPU capacity 
and connection bandwidth is connected to participate with the peers nodes, it will 
decrease the performance of the overall system. [21] 
3.2.2.4. The Design and Implementation of a Next Generation Name Service 
for the Internet 
Venugopalan and Emin [33] redesigned the DNS system to be of a high 
performance, resilient to attacks, fast update propagation, and can replace the 
existing DNS system without making changes to the clients.  It is a peer-to-peer 
solution and it uses distributed hash tables (DHT) structure. The nodes and records 
are assigned random identifiers and the records are stored at the home node 
(nearest node in the identifier space). This solution uses Beehive to reduce the 
latency time of the lookup but requires more space and bandwidth by automatically 
replicating the DNS mappings throughout the network to match the anticipated 
demand and provides a strong performance. It is done by locally measuring the 
access frequency of each record, and periodically aggregating them with other 
nodes at every aggregation interval. Then, each node aggregates values gathered 
from nodes one level higher in the routing table till it reaches the home node. The 
home node computes a final aggregate and propagates it to all replicas in the 
system. For the replication process, the home node determines the replication level 
to know which node should have a replica. The record does not have TTL values. If 
the record has changed, the home node will send the updated records to other 
nodes which have the replica. Home nodes ensure the correctness of the records 
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through DNSSEC standard protocol and also through a centralized authority to sign 
records fetched from the legacy DNS. The test was done with 75 nodes and the 
average query per second for the system was 6.5. The results show that the average 
bandwidth was 12.2 KB/s and the average number of records per node was 4127 
(13 MB), while the experiment started with no records stored in the nodes. This 
means that the load is evenly balanced across the nodes. Also, the update 
propagation is taking less than one second to reach 98% of the replicas and for the 
worst case scenario it takes less than a minute. So, this solution provides an 
effective resilience to attacks and has low update latencies [33]. But, this solution 
does not tackle the intentional disabling of DNS service by root DNS committee. 
3.2.2.5. Serving DNS using a Peer-to-Peer Lookup Service 
Russ et al. [32] used Chord peer-to-peer network protocol as a design to the 
DNS system to have a solution that is fault-tolerant, load balanced and eliminates 
the need of many administrations as it is the case of the existing DNS system. It uses 
the same resource record sets as the existing DNS system and also the DNSSEC 
protocol to ensure the authentication of data it receives. In this peer-to-peer 
structure, the distribution of the records over peer nodes is done using DHash (a 
hashing algorithm). To verify the effectiveness of the solution, a simulation was 
done with 1000 nodes and no record replication algorithm is applied and with no 
node failure. The result shows that the solution did an adequate job in balancing 
records among the nodes, but the response time was worse than the legacy DNS 




3.2.3. DNS Protection with DoS Defense Strategies 
There are many researches that have been made for DoS and DDoS, and 
there are many proposed defense systems to tackle these two common attacks. In 
this section, two of the proposed solutions will be discussed. They depend on the 
middleware software technology which allows the inter-process communication 
between different systems by hiding the heterogeneity among them. Wei et al. [35] 
showed a DoS preventing system for a distributed heterogeneous environment. The 
structure of this solution is to install two components in the network that operate 
in a virtual private environment. The two components are middleware box and 
domain agent. They are special devices inserted at various locations in the network. 
Middleware boxes have generic primitive functionality that can be reprogrammed 
to change their roles and functionality to suit the network condition in preventing 
DoS attacks. The domain agent is the controller, which controls the middleware 
boxes in its domain and also it has the capability to communicate with other 
domain agents to cooperate in case of DoS attack. Middleware boxes belong to only 
one domain and each domain is controlled by one domain agent. The middleware 
boxes will monitor, intercept, and filter the packets. When it detects potential 
events, it will alert the domain agent with some information about the event. The 
domain agent will store the events in its database and will check the alert with its 
intrusion detection system. If the result of this process indicates an attack, then 
with the information it has about the network and aggregated events it will take the 
optimal decision. The decision can be changing the role of the middleware boxes or 
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sending the intrusion report to other domain agents to cooperate and mitigate the 
effect of a DoS attack [35]. 
To enable the middleware boxes to communicate with each other, detect the 
attack, and change their policy and behavior, it needs to have at least these modules 
as specified in the paper: Attack detection module, signalling module, policy parser 
module, policy integration module, and traffic processing module. The proposed 
layers for the domain agent are: (1) Link Layer, which provides the controlling 
signals. (2) Device Layer, the controller of a single middleware box. (3) Aggregator 
Layer, which aggregates intrusion reports from different middleware boxes and 
allocates different middleware boxes to cooperate in case of attack. (4)  Feature 
Services Layer, which provides the virtual private operation environment services 
like VPN and DDoS prevention. For the signalling protocols, there are four which 
are: (1) Secured Topology Auto-Discovery, at the start of deployment, the domain 
agents create the self organized virtual network with middleware boxes. (2) 
Secured Software Download, which enables the middleware to download required 
or updated software from the domain agent using this protocol. (3) Run-Time 
Control Protocol, which specifies the message format between a middleware box 
and a domain agent. (4) Multiple Domain Support, which allows for the inter-
domain communication. This solution has three advantages. First it is transparent: 
the middleware hides the heterogeneity for the application, providing upward and 
downward compatibility. Second, the solution is efficient: with the limited defense 
resources, the system uses all of its capability to prevent the DDoS. Also, it can 
utilize the resources in different domains for this purpose. The third advantage is 
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the effectiveness: the solution can detect and prevent attacks without noticeable 
service degradation by the end users [35]. 
Mudhakar et al. [24] and Ling developed a middleware protection system for 
application level DoS. The solution uses middleware on the server side, and its 
operation is divided to server’s firewall and application layer. The proposed 
solution does not try to detect the DoS attack, but rather it determines the amount 
of used resources to satisfy a request. The evaluation of the request is used to 
prioritize clients. When the evaluation indicates high resources consumption, the 
client priority is decreased, giving the chance for the higher priority clients; thus, 
controlling the number of requests per unit time a client can issue. If the client 
exceeds this limit, the requests are filtered [24]. 
Depending on the size of the network to be protected and the service 
provided, this defense system can be adapted to mitigate the DoS attack. In this 
research, no defense strategy is used, but any defense strategy can be used as an 
extra layer of protection to enhance the DNS system and make it more robust to 
DDoS attack. 
3.3. Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Protocol for Internet 
Applications 
Chord is a structured peer-to-peer network protocol that maps keys to 
nodes. The Chord system is designed to efficiently assign nodes with suitable 
records of data to simplify the process of finding records among peer nodes. It is 
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also scalable with no need for centralized management to handle the joining and 
leaving nodes. The architecture of this protocol depends on the uses of consistent 
hashing to assign keys to nodes. With consistent hashing, the load (number of 
records) between nodes tends to be balanced and when nodes join or leave, there 
would be little movement of data. For a Chord node to perform a lookup to map a 
key to a node, it needs to communicate with other nodes based on routing 
information. Each node builds the routing table once it joins the Chord network. 
The table contains information about the other nodes. Each row in the table stores 
information about a node, which are node’s IP address and its hashed value. Node’s 
hashed value is the hashing result of the node’s IP address. In Chord network 
consisting of N nodes, the number of rows in the table is O(log N). In Chord paper 
[10], the routing table is called finger table and the i-th row is called finger i. Each 
finger has a value which is the result of adding the node’s hashed value with 2i, 
where i is the finger number. A finger table is populated with nodes’ information by 
finding the home node of each finger. To achieve that, for every finger a lookup is 
generated to find the home node of the finger value. Once the home node for a 
finger is found, the home node information is stored within the finger. An example 
of how the finger table is created is shown in Figure ‎3.2. The structure of the finger 
table has two advantages, first it stores information about small number of nodes 
and the seconds it knows more about the nearer nodes and less about far nodes. To 
make the system function as desired, the finger table should be updated 
periodically to avoid inconsistency in the network. Different algorithms need to be 
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executed regularly to correct the finger table for any new joining or leaving node 
from the system. 
 
Figure ‎3.2: Routing table for node in Chord network. 
 
To locate the home node of a request, any node receiving a request will 
forward it to the node in its finger table that satisfies this condition: its hashed 
value is the largest among the others and smaller than the request hashed value in 
the identifier space. This process is repeated at each node till the request reaches 
the home node which responds to the requester directly. Locating the home node 
requires passing through intermediate nodes each having latency. That is, each 
node will introduce more delay resulting in larger response time. The response 
time will differ from one request to another depending on the number of nodes the 
requests will pass through. In the worst case, it is O(log N). If the network size is 
very large, then it can lead to a large response time. Chord can maintain additional 
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routing information to reduce the number of hopping, but at the expense of more 
complexity. 
A simulation has been performed and the results show good performance 
even in the face of concurrent node arrivals and departures and it continues to 
function correctly, although at a degraded performance. At this performance 
condition, the nodes’ finger table is not fully update to point to the right nodes, 
which yield to larger number of timeouts and number of hops. The test also shows 
that the best frequency of running the stabilization algorithm is the same as the 
frequency of leaving and joining nodes [10]. 
3.3.1. Enhance Chord Performance 
Chord performance is directly affected by the size of the network. As the 
network size increases, the path length for the lookup increases which in turn 
increases the latency for the lookups. Yi and Jinyuan [46] worked on creating 
improved Chord protocol, which is a low latency Chord (LLCHORD). LLCHORD 
reduces the query latency while retaining the same number of hops for the lookup. 
To reduce the latency, LLCHORD looked to two concerns in Chord, i.e., number of 
hops to resolve the lookup and query latency between peers. For the first concern, 
LLCHORD reduces the average number of hops by maintaining the nodes’ 
information in the counter clockwise in addition to clockwise that is maintained by 
Chord. The finger table in this case is populated with clockwise and counter 
clockwise nodes, and the information gathered for both is the same except for the 
use of subtraction instead of addition in the case of counter clockwise. This 
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additional information will make it possible for a lookup to be routed in the counter 
clockwise direction too; and in this case, the path to the destination will require 
fewer hops. For the other concern which deals with query latency between peers, it 
is caused by the mismatch between nodes’ physical locations and the peer-to-peer 
overlay network. There are many solutions to localize nodes on the Internet among 
the other nodes. One solution is the IDMap which uses the trace to find the latency 
between the peers and then advertise the results to them. Another solution is the 
Global Network Positioning (GNP) model which uses Landmark nodes to measure 
the round trip time (RTT) between nodes to create a 2D space of their locations. 
With this model peers can find their locations in the 2D space by measuring the 
RTT to the landmark nodes. The two mentioned solutions can be used in LLCHORD, 
but usually these kinds of services are not easy to get in peer-to-peer environments 
since they requires either a centralized node or third party nodes to perform the 
measurements. LLCHORD can depend on simple measurements such as finding 
only the RTT between the node and nodes in its finger table. After the collection of 
these measurements, they are stored in another table called the neighbor table. 
With the new design, the routing is no longer the same as Chord, but it requires 
extra steps. The routing starts by finding the successor of the key in clockwise or 
counter clockwise directions. Then, find the nearest node in the neighbor table to 
the successor node. That node should also be nearer in key space to the destination 
than the current node. The process is repeated till the destination node is reached. 
The ideal case is finding the destination node in the neighbor table and the query 
can be routed directly. While this approach will reduce query latency, it will 
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eventually result in larger number of lookup hops; and with the bidirectional query, 
the lookup hops will tend to be the same as in Chord. A simulation is made for this 
study and the results indicate larger number of hops in LLCHORD than in Chord. In 
a Chord network, the average path length is 5.62 whereas in LLCHORD it is 6.94. On 
the other hand the average lookup latency in LLCHORD is 79.87 ms and in Chord it 
is 85.2 ms [46]. 
Yu et al. [48] reformate Chord link to enhance the lookup performance and 
also minimize the influence of the dynamic network. Besides this, the load 
balancing can be obtained as well. The proposed structure makes a group of nodes 
as the basic unit in the Chord ring. Each group consists of one or more nodes, and 
lookups will be traversing groups instead of the nodes which is the case in Chord. 
Grouping will scale down the network size to result in shorter path length. Nodes 
with similar bits in the range (25, 32) of their IP addresses will belong to the same 
group and the group identifier will be the result of hashing those bits. Keys are 
distributed over groups; and in a group with multiple nodes, the key is assigned to a 
node with good capability. Also, in each group there is a representative node 
responsible for storing and updating the group table. The group table is 
constructed like the finger table in Chord, but each row has a group identifier and 
the IP address of the representative node. To make it possible for a lookup to locate 
a key, another table is required which is GroupIN table. It contains the information 
about the nodes in the group, such as node identifier, node IP address, key location, 
and the representative node. All the nodes will communicate with each other from 
time to time to have the updated GroupIN table. Simulation runs have been 
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performed with maximum group size is 4 nodes and the results show improvement 
in the average path length compared to the original Chord. The difference is about 
0.9 in all scenarios of different network sizes [48]. 
3.3.2. Balance Load among Nodes 
Chord simulation outputs, for the case of load balance, as shown in [10] 
Figure 8, shows large variation in the number of keys assigned to nodes. In these 
simulation runs there were nodes storing no key while other nodes store more than 
450 keys. The explanation to this phenomenon is explained clearly in [10]. For the 
purpose of completion and clarification, we re-iterate this explanation here. Nodes 
position within Chord is based on the output of the hashing algorithm SHA-1 which 
is random. This randomness of the nodes distribution over the identifier space 
causes ununiformed gaps between nodes. The consequence is that nodes far from 
the predecessor in the identifier space will have large key assignments; on the 
other hand, nodes nearer to their predecessors will result in less key assignments. 
Figure ‎3.3 illustrate the inconsistency of key assignment with an example of a 
Chord network consisting of three nodes (A, B, C). In this example the difference 
between node B and its predecessor (A) is 10, while the difference between C and B 
is 72. Again, as the hashing used (SHA-1) for keys is uniform the probability of keys 
assigned to C will be higher and that indicates more loads targeting C than B. 
Chord proposed a solution to the unbalanced load problem by introducing a 
mechanism to re-map the identifier space to the nodes. Virtual nodes are used here 
to map the identifier space to the real nodes. Each of the virtual nodes will be 
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assigned a random key which is independent and unrelated to each other. As in the 
case of real node each of the virtual nodes will be responsible for the keys in its 
range. Then randomly map multiple of those virtual nodes to each real node. The 
simulation results showed a better balance as the number of virtual nodes per real 
node increased. With 20 virtual nodes mapped to one real node, the range of keys 
per node is [50, 160] whereas it is [0, 480] without virtual nodes. [10] 
 
Figure ‎3.3: An example of a Chord network with three nodes (A, B, C), showing the 











B – A = 10
C – B = 72
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CHAPTER 4  
TWO LAYERS P2P SOLUTION 
This chapter describes our proposed Two Layers P2P (TLP2P) solution and 
its structure. This chapter also includes the advantages and limitations of the 
solution with the assumptions for the design to function as required. 
4.1. Structure of the Proposed Solution 
Structured peer-to-peer networks are self managed, fault tolerant and 
robust against the DoS attack [19] [21]. The proposed design uses a structured 
peer-to-peer network to inherit its advantages. By making the design based on 
peer-to-peer, it will be self managed eliminating the need for a centralized control 
over the system which is the main issue we want to tackle. The new structure 
consists of two levels of overlay networks and both are based on Chord protocol. 
The selection of Chord was based on the simplicity of its design, provable 
correctness and provable performance. Also by comparing Chord with Pastry which 
is another P2P protocol, it shows that Chord has better resistance against DoS and 
location hiding. However, the Content-Addressable Network (CAN) P2P protocol is 
better in these two criteria compared to the other two P2P protocols, but CAN 
requires more computation and complexity [8]. In addition, in Chord the load 
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balance and lookup path length are more consistent than CAN which makes Chord a 
good selection for this problem [10].  
The new structure consists of two overlay networks namely local overlay 
network (LON) and global overlay network (GON). A blocked region will construct 
a LON to serve client requests while GON will server LON to answer the request 
through the legacy system. Figure ‎4.1 explains the concept which shows multiple 
LONs consisting of different number of nodes and GON serving all LONs. The next 
sections will have further explanation of the two overlay networks along with the 
difference between the nodes. 
 
 




4.1.1. Local Overlay Network (LON) 
LON consists of nodes belonging to the blocked region and they are not 
expected to be able to resolve DNS queries from the legacy DNS system. The 
function of those nodes is to answer DNS requests coming from clients in the 
blocked region. To answer DNS requests, they need to have the answer in the cache 
or direct the request to the second layer which is GON. When the request is directed 
to the second layer, the answer comes back to LON in which the home node for the 
request will cache the answer and send a copy to the client. Figure ‎4.2 shows the 




Figure ‎4.2: Local Overlay Network Flowchart 
4.1.2. Global Overlay Network (GON) 
The nodes in this layer are of two types, resolver nodes and gateway nodes. 
Resolver nodes’ main job is to resolve DNS queries coming from LON by forwarding 
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the requests to the legacy DNS system. They are expected to be able to resolve DNS 
queries through the existing DNS system. The other type of nodes is the gateway 
nodes which participate in both layers and as they are part of LON then they are not 
expected to be resolving DNS queries from legacy DNS system. They work as a 
gateway between the two layers and their existence in GON is mandatory to direct 
unresolved queries from LON to GON. Their other function is acting as the 
authoritative DNS servers for all authoritative DNS servers in their region. This will 
enable clients to resolve DNS names for authoritative servers in the blocked region. 
GON serves multiple LONs and has at least one gateway node from each LON. When 
a query comes from LON, it will be passed through the gateway node for that LON. 
A lookup process will find the home node for the request which will answer either 
from its cache or the legacy DNS system. The home node in this case has to be a 
resolver node, otherwise the request needs to be routed to the first successor 





Figure ‎4.3: Global Overlay Network Flowchart 
 
4.1.3. Cached Records Expiration 
To ensure the availably of the answers to clients’ request, the behavior of 
peers in GON with respect to DNS records will depend on the source of the answer. 
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The DNS answers can be coming from the legacy DNS system or from an 
authoritative DNS server in GON or LON. When answers are received from the 
legacy DNS system, GON caches them with their TTL values. While if the 
authoritative DNS server is part of GON or LON, then all its records are stored in 
GON without their TTL value. With this way, any changes to a record will trigger the 
authoritative DNS server to publish the changes to the home node of the record 
which will make the necessary actions to reflect the update. LON peers always store 
the TTL value unless the authoritative DNS server is in its LON. In the case the peer 
in LON stores the TTL value, it will prioritize the records based on the number of 
requests to determine the updating mechanism for cached records. Cached records 
with high priority will be updated with a proactive cache which refreshes the 
records whenever they expire. On the other hand, lower priority cached records 
will be in the passive cache, in which an expired record will not be updated unless a 
client requests it. This will ensure faster update propagation of obsolete records to 
LON and GON, where only two peers need to be updated, and will reduce the traffic 
that can be caused with the expiration of the TTL while no change has occurred. 
Also, the proactive caching will enhance the response time for highly queried 
records. 
4.1.4. Request Scenario 
A scenario of a client who wants to resolve a name to IP will start by sending 
the DNS query to LON.  Any peer can serve the request and start the process of the 
lookup. When the request reaches the home node, it will check the cache and if it 
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has an answer it will reply with the cached answer. Otherwise, the node will 
forward the request to the gateway node. The gateway node will start the lookup 
process to find the resolver home node for the request in the GON. Once the home 
node is found it will either reply with an answer from the cache if it exists or will 
direct the request to the legacy DNS system. For the second case, the home node 
would receive an answer from the legacy DNS system in the normal case. Then it 
will reply to the home node in LON which in turn will cache the answer and will 
forward a copy to the client. 
It might be thought that when LON has only one node, TLP2P will behave 
like pure Chord. However, when LON has one node the lookup to find the home 
node is zero and the cache result is found immediately, whereas in the case of the 
Chord the lookup will be on overage 
 
 
         to find the home nodes. 
4.2. Advantages 
Building the structure as two overlay networks has many advantages over 
the existing system. One of the gained advantages is more effective caching. It has 
been achieved by splitting the blocked areas by their geographical location into 
overlay networks, since people belonging to the same area will more likely have the 
same interest which will increase the possibility of accessing the same records. It is 
supported by the fact that members of the same culture or subculture will have 
similar behavior and activity in the Internet [11] [20]. As a result, the cache will 
have a higher hit rate and the effect over the whole system is better response time.  
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Also the peers with this design will be near each other which will have less 
communication latency between them. In addition, LON can increase cache 
utilization by implementing a replication algorithm to replicate DNS records on 
multiple peers, but it will not be discussed in this research.  
It is also good to mention that splitting culture will limit the set size of DNS 
records allowing a small size memory to cache all favorite records. In other words if 
Least Recently Used caching algorithm is used then the algorithm most likely will 
not discard a frequently requested record with nowadays memory size in case of 
full cache. Along with these mentioned advantages LON size can be elastic based on 
the demand. For example, we can increase the number of peers when performance 
starts degrading or reduce the number of peers if the utilization is low. 
In summary, our proposed solution has the following advantages: 
1. Self-managing structure: the structure is based on peer-to-peer. The system 
automatically manages the joining and leaving nodes as well as the allocation of 
DNS records and locating them. 
2. Harder to detect the cooperating nodes by enemies: the structure requires 
cooperating nodes to be known only by the GON peers which are gateway nodes 
and cooperating nodes. To identify the peers, the enemy must be in GON. In 
addition, Chord protocol has a good location hiding [8]. 
3. More resilient to DoS attack: in this design, there is no single point of failure. 
To halt the system, all the peers in the network need to be attacked and that will 
require large amount of resources to make the attack successful. In addition, to 
start the attack, the peers need to be known first which will not be an easy task. 
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If in any case the first layer has been attacked and the network became not 
accessible, the second layer can serve from the cache. 
4. Faster update to obsolete records: records are cached in two locations which 
are GON and LON. Any update to the records will need to be reflected in these 
two locations only, which makes it easier and faster to propagate the update. 
5. All peers in TLP2P will be able to resolve hostnames belonging to the 
served blocked regions: in case a region is blocked by the international 
Internet service provider, any DNS queries will not be processed by higher DNS 
servers. This includes resolution queries, registration of new DNS domain, and 
update requests. By that, all hostnames for the hosts in the blocked regions will 
be unresolvable. However, if the clients join TLP2P, then they will be able to 
resolve all the hostnames, because the authoritative DNS servers’ will publish 
the updates within TLP2P as discussed earlier, and clients in TLP2P will be able 
to resolve the hostnames normally. 
6. Better utilization of the cache in LON which results in lower response 
time: LONs are created based on the geographical locations and users belonging 
to the same location will more likely share the same interests, which increases 
the likelihood of using the same services on the Internet. This will limit the 
number of popular records and will increase cache hit rate resulting in lower 
response time. 
7. Different replication algorithm of popular records can be used in LON 
based on the culture activity: a replication algorithm can be applied to 
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increase the hit rate and reduce the response time. The replication algorithm 
can be different from one LON to another to suit the needs. 
8. Virtual nodes can be used to distribute Loads evenly: the new design uses 
Chord protocol which can achieve good load balance by introducing the virtual 
nodes in the Chord network, as discussed in Chord paper [10]. 
9. No change to client side: the client will use the same DNS protocol to resolve 
hostnames. The difference is in the resolution of the query which is transparent 
to the client. 
10. Advantages of the current DNS are inherited by our design: there are many 
advantages in the current DNS system like the security layer DNSSEC and 
multiple IPs as a load balance approach to service providers. Any advantage that 
is not related to the design structure can be implemented in the new design 
with no or minimal modification. 
Advantages 1 to 4 are inherited from Chord and the rest are based on the proposed 
solution. 
4.3. Limitations 
The main concern with the new design is the number of hops to resolve a 
query. Chord network has an average of          hops for lookups where N is the 
number of nodes in the network. However, the proposed solution consists of two 
overlay networks which can result in larger number of hops. To have control over 
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the number of hops, LON size should be kept small and this cannot be achieved 
without a full control over LON. Also, as the load increases, new peers need to join 
the network. As a solution, LON can be split into two smaller LONs, but it is not a 
simple task especially in an active system. 
4.4. Assumptions 
The assumptions for the proposed solution to function correctly are:  
 There are some cooperating nodes which can resolve a DNS query on behalf of 
other nodes. In the simulation, the system was functioning in a good condition 
with only 100 resolvers out of 1000 nodes, that is 10% of the nodes were 
resolvers. 




CHAPTER 5  
SIMULATOR 
This chapter discusses the implementation of the simulator to evaluate the 
proposed structure. It also includes simulator results of Chord protocol to verify its 
correctness by comparing results obtained with results presented in Chord paper 
[10]. 
5.1. Simulator’s Design 
The simulator is developed with Java programming language. The approach 
used for lookup is recursive lookup in which a received lookup will be forwarded to 
the next node based on the information in the finger table and the process is 
repeated till the home node is found. On the other hand, the simulator used in the 
Chord paper [10] is based on an iterative lookup. In the iterative lookup, when a 
node receives a request, it will communicate with other nodes to retrieve 
information from their finger table to find the home node. Each of the two methods 
should have the same result and the simulators should generate the same output as 




Figure ‎5.1: Simulator Design Layers. The two columns at the middle of the layer stack is for 
the two different structure of simulated networks (proposed solution and normal Chord) 
The design of the developed simulator is made of five different layers as 
shown in the Figure ‎5.1 and these layers are composed of multiple classes. The core 
layer consists of the Chord protocol and part of it is the Chord algorithms like the 
stabilization algorithm and the lookup algorithm. The second layer creates the 
Chord network by initializing the Chord nodes first and then linking them by 
building the finger and successor tables as well as the other parameters. The third 
layer extends the simulator capability to have another overlay network acting as 
the global overlay network when simulating the proposed solution. However, when 
simulating the normal Chord network, this layer is skipped to the next layer. The 
next layer is the simulator engine which consists of random generator, query 
generator, queue manager, and the processor. The random generators follow 











uniform, Poisson, and Zipf. The query generator part generates random queries 
using a different random generator depending on the simulation scenario. When 
queries are generated, they are filled in a queue and only one global queue for all 
nodes exists in the simulator. The queue is managed by the queue manager which 
also manages the stabilization queue. The stabilization queue is for stabilization 
algorithms and it is invoked at every stabilization period which is stored in the 
request state of the stabilization request. The last part of this layer deals with 
request processing, like lookup request and stabilization requests. The top layer in 
the design is the simulator layer and it is the layer responsible to start the 
simulation runs. It initializes the other layers based on the scenario. Once the 
simulator is started, collecting measures starts till the completion of the simulation. 
5.2. Simulator’s Assumption 
There are three assumptions while designing the simulator and they are: 
 No TTL value for DNS names. 
 No query processing time. 
 Only one query is resolved at a time. 
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5.3. Simulation Measures 
5.3.1. Load Balance 
To study how keys are distributed over nodes with a consistent hashing 
(SHA), a number of simulations are carried out with different number of keys while 
having the same number of nodes. The number of nodes in the network is 10,000 
and the number of keys varied starting from 10,000 to 1000,000 with an increment 
of 10,000. The size of bit identifier m is 160 and it is same for all scenarios. As the 
simulation in Chord [10], for each simulation setting, the simulation was repeated 
19 times generating a total of 200 outputs. The measure collected were the number 
of keys resolved by each node. 
5.3.2. Path Length 
The number of hops is one of the main factors affecting Chord protocol 
performance.  Resolving queries in Chord network depends on distributed hashing 
tables. This requires query lookup to traverse through multiple nodes and 
depending on 1) the starting node, 2) the state of the intermediate nodes and their 
hashing table, and 3) the location of the home node in the Chord network, the 
number of hopes differs from one lookup to another. To find the effect of each of 
network size, node failures, and node join/leave on path length, multiple of 
simulations are performed.  
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5.3.2.1. Varying Network Size 
For the case of network size, the simulation starts with a network consisting 
of 8 nodes and 800 lookups were generated. Doubling for each simulation the 
number of nodes and lookups to reach to     and         lookups. For each 
value, a separate simulation was implemented and repeated for 19 times. 
Simulation inputs are the number of nodes which equals to    and the number of 
keys       , where k = [3, 14]. The output of those simulations is the path lengths 
of the lookups. 
5.3.2.2. Simulation with Nodes Failure 
Failure simulation is performed to experiment the effect of changing the 
node status from active to failed on the path length. The simulations start with a 
network consisting of 1000 nodes in a stable state. That is, all nodes are active and 
the finger tables point to the correct nodes as well as the successor list which is of 
size 20. Then, random nodes failed simultaneously with a probability of 10% with 
increment of 10% in the rest of the simulations up to 50% for the last. To evaluate 
the impact of massive node failures, the stabilization algorithms are disabled and 
10000 lookups were issued randomly. At the start of node failures, none of the 
active nodes knows about any failed node. But while resolving lookups active nodes 
will try to forward the request to the next nodes based on their finger table. If the 
next node is a failed node, then the communication will time out indicating a failed 
node and resulting in removing the failed node from the node’s finger table. The 
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output of these simulations is the path length which will include the time out as 
well. For each of the 5 failing probabilities scenarios, a separate simulation was 
performed and was repeated for 4 times.  
5.3.2.3. Simulation with Nodes Joining and Leaving 
The last case of simulation is the excessive joining and leaving of nodes 
while resolving lookups. The simulator configuration is as follows: 
 Network size is 1000. 
 Successor list size is 20. 
 Lookups generated with Poisson process of a rate one per second. 
 Joining and leaving rate follow Poisson distribution. 
 8 different simulations with different rates. The simulations start with 0.05 
'join' and 'leave' per second and the last simulation has a 'join' and 'leave' rate of 
0.40. The increment in each simulation is 0.05. 
 Nodes run the stabilization algorithm at a uniform time interval [15, 45]. 
Collected outputs are path length (hops + timeout), timeouts, and failed lookups. 
The simulation scenarios have been repeated for 4 times. 
5.3.2.4. Simulation with Node Blockage 
For the purpose of testing the proposed solution, an additional scenario will 
be simulated to find the effectiveness of TLP2P in the case of resolver nodes in GON 
got blocked. The scenario will measure the path length and the load balance while a 
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portion of the nodes are blocked at the start of the simulation. The number of 
blocked nodes will vary in each simulation by 10%, starting in the first simulation 
with 10% of the nodes blocked and ending with 90%. The number of nodes in the 
network is 1000 and the number of lookups generated is 10,000. 
5.4. Performance Metrics 
The simulation results will discuss five different measures that will be 
explained in this section. Some of these measures are calculated on GON and LON 
level as well as the total of the two whenever applicable. In all measures the 1st and 
99th percentiles are calculated too. The pth percentile is the value that falls at the 
p% of the result set. 
1. Load Balance: has two measures 
o Number of records stored per node: 
Average Load =  
∑                              
 
   
 
 , where n = 
number of nodes and i represents nodes. 
The 1st and 99th percentiles presented with the average load in the 
simulation results, will indicate how balanced the load is. 
o Load fairness between nodes. The resulted value by evaluating the 
equation can be in the range of 0 to 1. Closer value to 1 indicates 
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 , where Ni is the number of keys resolved 
by the ith node and 'count' is the number of nodes. 
2. Path length: is the number of nodes hopped for the request to find the 
home node. 
Path length =  
∑                  
 
   
 
 , where n = Total number of 
requests and i represents requests. 
For the scenarios where there are failing or departing nodes, the path 
length accounts for timeout requests as well. So, it will be: 
Path length =  
∑                                      
 
   
 
  
3. Timeout: is the number of times a node is trying to connect to a non-
existing node (failed or left the network) while resolving a request. 
Timeout =  
∑                     
 
   
 
 , where n = Total number of 
requests and i represents requests. 
4. Lookup Failure: is the number of mapped lookups to an incorrect home 
node. 
Lookup Failure =   
                              
      
.  
5. Hit Count: is the number of resolved lookups from the cache. When the 
lookup is resolved at LON without going to GON, it is considered as a hit. 
Hit Count = Total number of hits. 
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5.5. Simulator’s Validation 
The four simulation scenarios in Chord paper will be simulated using the 
implemented simulator. Each of the following subsections will discuss and compare 
results obtained with results presented in Chord [10]. 
5.5.1. Load Balance 
Figure ‎5.2 shows the comparison of the two results, the Chord paper and 
implemented simulator. It is clear from the graph that both simulators have the 
same results.  
 
Figure ‎5.2: The mean, 1st and 99th percentiles of the number of keys stored per node in 





































5.5.2. Path Length 
In path length scenario, the outputs are identical as shown in Figure ‎5.3. The 
difference in percentiles is normal and it is due to the randomness of inputs to the 
simulations. 
 
Figure ‎5.3: Average path length, 1st and 99th percentiles of lookups with varying number of 
nodes 
 
The proof of the average path length has been explained in Chord [10], but a 
detailed explanation will be presented here as well since in the next chapter, we 
will depend on this result to create the simulation scenarios. 























Let node n generate a random lookup for a key k. Recall that each node has a 
finger table and each entry i stores the home node of n + 2i. 
Table ‎5-1: Finger table for node n 
i Home node of Home node must be in 
1 n + 20 [ n + 20, n ) 
2 n + 21 [ n + 21, n ) 







m n + 2m-1 [ n + 2m-1, n ) 
 
With this information, let us find the worst case where                . 
With this condition, n will forward the request to the home of (n + 2m-1) and let us 
call it n1. As                , node n1 will not forward the request to the home 
node of (n1 + 2m - 1), which is finger number m, because finger m will cover the 
interval [n, n1). In other words, it covers the interval [n, n + 2m-1) and this interval 
does not overlap with key interval in the first assumption which is            . 
So, for the worst case scenario, node n1 will forward the query to the home node of 
finger number (m – 1). The process is repeated by forwarding the received query to 
the next node, which is the finger m – 2 of the receiving node. In summary, the 
request will be forwarded as follows: node n (finger m)  node n1 (finger m – 1)  
node n2 (finger m – 2) … … …  node nm-1 (finger 1 = successor)  the number of 
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hops for worst case scenario is m – 1. From this result, we can say that, after x hops, 
there are at most 2m/2x – 1 nodes to reach the home node. In case of a network with 
N uniformly distributed random nodes, there should be only one node after 
hopping 2m/N - 1 nodes with a high probability. In other words, after         hops, 
there is only one node to reach the home node with a high probability. For the 
average path length, it equals to (maximum + minimum)/2, because the nodes are 
distributed over Chord ring based on SHA algorithm which follows uniform 
distribution as well as the key and assigned node are uniformly random. The 
minimum path length is for the case where the home node is the successor node of 
the requester which does not require any hop and the maximum as found 
is        . So, the average path length =  
 
 
        . The results in Figure ‎5.3 show 
that the average path length is the same as the proofed theoretical average. 
Another proof of the average path length is using the difference in bits 
between node hash identifier and key identifier. Let k be the key that is queried to 
find its home node. Depending on the difference between the node and the key in 
binary, the node will determine which finger to follow. Let us assume the most 
significant bit is i. If i is 1, then the lookup will be forwarded to the home node of 
the ith finger and by that the 1 is flipped to 0. The other case is where the ith bit is 0, 
then no forward is performed at this stage, rather the next bit is examined. The 
process goes again for the next bit and the same process is repeated till the home 
node is reached. This means that the number of hops (path length) is the number of 
ones in binary that differ between home node identifier and the key. Since the node 
identifiers are distributed randomly, then the expected number of ones are half of 
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the bit on average  average path length =  
 
 
        . The part         came from 
the number of bits to test. 
5.5.3. Simultaneous Node Failures 
In Figure ‎5.4, the path length is shown for both simulators for the node 
failure scenario. Again, both simulators have the same average path length and the 
difference in percentile is due to randomness of the inputs. 
 
Figure ‎5.4: Average path length, 1st and 99th percentiles of lookups with random node failed 
before start resolving lookups 
5.5.4. Lookups during Stabilization 
In this scenario, the measures have three results which are the path length, 
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for the two simulators and the minor difference in 99th percentile is expected and it 
is as stated before because of the random query and nodes. The output presented in 
Figure ‎5.7 is for the number of failed lookups. It is unlike the other figures, and it 
presents the average number of failed requests with the minimum and maximum 
values for the different runs. The results shows a difference between the two 
simulators outputs, but also the same difference appears in the simulator 
developed in [5] which is presented in [5] Figure 6.10. The reason of the 
dissimilarity is the randomness of four random variables that account into the 
lookup failure. To know these random variables, it would be better to understand 
first how a lookup is resolved to an incorrect home node. A failed lookup occurs 
when the predecessor (np) of the home node (nh) receive the request and nh has 
just joined while np is not aware of the newly joining home node. In such a case, np 
will map falsely to the successor of nh as the home node of the request, which 
results in a failed lookup. The four random variables in this case are the request, 
time of the request, the home node, and the time of joining. The inconsistency in the 
failed lookup outputs can also be noticed in Chord simulator output, the rate 0.40 
has a lower number of failed lookups than the rate 0.35, while the expectation of a 




Figure ‎5.5: Average path length, 1st and 99th percentiles of lookups while node joining and 
leaving the network 
 
Figure ‎5.6: Average, 1st and 99th percentiles of timed out requests while nodes leaving and 



















































Figure ‎5.7: Average, minimum and maximum of failed lookups while nodes leaving and 
joining the Chord network 
The implemented simulator has almost an exact output compared to the 
Chord simulator in all cases, except for some difference in one output which is 
acceptable due to the nature of the inputs as explained in the previous paragraph. 
The simulator will be used to implement the proposed solution to study the 




































CHAPTER 6  
SIMULATION AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
Simulation results will be presented in this chapter for the proposed 
solution. Three different scenarios are simulated with different requests 
distributions. Out of the three, there are two worst cases, one with request 
repetition and the other with no repetition. The third case scenario is for the best 
case with request repetition. 
6.1. Simulation Scenarios for Proposed Structure 
In the designed structure, a GON can serve multiple LONs, however in all 
simulation scenarios there will be one GON serving only one LON. This is a 
limitation due to the time and memory required for simulation. To study the 
effectiveness of the solution, it will be compared with normal Chord network. The 
same nodes number in normal Chord network simulations will be distributed over 
GON and LON in TLP2P simulation. The aim is to have a fair comparison between 
the two designs. In the nodes distribution the consideration is to form a worst case 
scenario while the second modeling the best case scenario. As stated before, the 
path length is the main factor determining the performance of the design and hence 
the node distribution will be evaluated to find the highest path length. 
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To find the highest path length lets define some variables: 
 n : number of nodes in LON 
 N : number of nodes in GON 
 t : total number of nodes in LON and GON 
 p : average path length. Path length for LON and GON 
 
With this information 
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   =  
 
 
  (critical point) 
Now the critical point needs to be examined to find out whether it is global maxima 
or global minima. For that the second derivative need to be found. 
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Evaluate the critical point in the second derivative 
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The result is negative which indicates it is a global maxima. So the highest path 
length occurs when LON and GON size is t/2. Now let us find the local minima. First, 
the critical point is found as a global maxima. The other points to check are the 
boundary points. The interval of the network size for GON and LON is [1, t – 1]. 
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By this result, the local minima is at 1 and (t – 1). In other words, the minimum path 
length will occur in case of number of LON’s nodes is 1 or t – 1.  
To ensure the results are as found, Figure ‎6.1 shows the plot of path length 
which is in the Z-axis and LON and GON size in X and Y-axis respectively. The plot 
illustrates the points and gives a view of how the path length changes as the 
number of nodes changes in LON and GON. The shape of the plot is almost half a 
circle having the highest point in the middle and decreases toward the edges of the 
interval. In this plot, the number of nodes as total is 100 and the interval for both 
networks is [1, 99]. The plot supports the results obtained for the global maxima 




Figure ‎6.1: Path length in term of network size, p =  
 
          
 
 
        . The total number of 
nodes is 100 and the point shown repersents the heighest path length when GON and LON 
size is 100/2 and lowest path length when either network having only one node. 
 
The simulation scenarios are summarized in Table ‎6-1 and they are: 
 Scenario#1: 50% of total nodes will be distributed over the two overlay 
networks and it will be compared to normal Chord simulation. The request 
distribution will follow the uniform distribution and no request repetition. 
 Scenario#2: Same as the first scenario but the request distribution will follow 
Zipf distribution which has a request repetition. The results will be compared 
with normal Chord simulation but with a Zipf distributed requests. 
 Scenario#3: LON will contain 5% of the total number of nodes while GON will 
have 95%. The simulation again will be compared with normal Chord 
simulation that had Zipf distributed request as in the previous scenario.  
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For each of the simulation configuration the five scenarios stated earlier will 
be simulated and they are: 
 Load Balance 
 Path Length 
 Node Failure 
 Join & Leave 
 Node Blockage 
Table ‎6-1: Simulation configuration 
 
Request Distribution 
Configuration Uniform Zipf 
Chord √ √ 
TLP2P Worst Case √ √ 




The intention of simulating the TLP2P solution with uniform distributed 
request is to study how the TLP2P can utilize the cache to reduce the path length 
and thus the dependency on the legacy DNS system. For this reason, the simulations 
were run for only one simulations configuration that is uniform worst case. 
The selection of Zipf distribution for the simulation was based on many 
researches. It has been proven by many measurements of real life traffic that 
human behaviors follow Zipf distribution. However, the number of users’ 
communities and the size can make a difference in the distribution. Smaller 
communities follow Zipf-like distribution while if the communities are very large 
the distribution will be Zipf. In the simulated scenarios, the assumption is that the 
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system is serving a very large number of communities, and thus the Zipf 
distribution is the right one for these simulations [18]. 
The reason of simulating the best case scenario with 5% of nodes in LON 
and 95% in GON is due to the join & leave scenario where the number of leaving 
nodes is 12 per stabilization period. If the calculated best case is used in the 
simulation which is LON will have only one node then LON will be totally empty. 
For that, the size of LON is increased to meet the requirement for the join & leave 
scenario to run. 
While the solution has mentioned the possibility of having a replication 
algorithm to enhance the lookup hops and also having virtual peers to increase the 
load balance between nodes, neither of these enhancements were implemented. 
Also, in all cases of the simulations, the nodes start with empty caching regardless 
of request distribution and requests repetition. 
6.2. Simulation Results 
6.2.1. Worst Case Scenario with no Request Repetition 
6.2.1.1. Load Balance 
The load is doubling by cutting the network size by half, in general the 
average load is represented by dividing the number of requests by the number of 
nodes in Chord network. Figure ‎6.2 also shows that the load in 99th percentile is 
doubling by dividing the size of the network by half. The results shown for LON and 
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GON in the figure have the same average number of keys per node since they have 
the exact setting and they are receiving the same query load. However, the average 
load in LON and GON networks differ from normal Chord network because Chord 
network has twice the size of GON and LON network. Figure ‎6.3 presents the load 
fairness between nodes for each of the three networks. The fairness is the same for 
all and it is almost 0.5. These results indicate that, pure Chord and TLP2P are 
identical in term of load fairness. For the coming two scenarios, the fairness results 
are not presented because all fairness results have almost the same output as 
Figure ‎6.3. 
 
Figure ‎6.2: The plot of the average load with fix number of nodes and varying number of 
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Figure ‎6.3: Load fairness results for the three networks normal Chord, GON and LON. 
6.2.1.2. Path Length 
Figure ‎6.4 displays the simulation results which show that the path length is 
also affected by the network size as discussed and proven earlier in this chapter. 
The results for LON and GON show both networks have equal average path length. 
This is due to the same configuration is being set for both networks and they have 
the same network size. Also, the same queries are passed from LON to GON which 
yield to same average path length. However, the difference occurs between the 
overlays networks in TLP2P and normal Chord which can be explained by the path 
length formula. The difference basically equals 
to   
 
                                   
 
 
                  , since the size of the network 
in normal Chord network is double the size of LON, the formula can be rewritten in 
this way  
 
           
 
 
         which equals to 
 
 
         which is 0.5. So the difference in 
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case obtained in the simulation results. Of course, the total path length for the 
TLP2P network is the addition of the path length of LON and GON. 
 
Figure ‎6.4: Path length measures for normal Chord simulation and LON and GON as well as 
the total in TLP2P simulation with different network size and query load. 
6.2.1.3. Simultaneous Node Failures 
In this scenario, the path length increases as the failure fraction is increased. 
The increase in both LON and GON is almost the same as the normal Chord network 
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Figure ‎6.5: Path length measures for node failures scenario. The plot has four results 
normal Chord, LON, GON and the total for the TLP2P. 
6.2.1.4. Lookups during Stabilization 
The path length has a minor variation with increasing the 'join' and 'leave' 
rate. This is occurring for the two simulations and with about 0.2 higher in LON and 
GON than in the normal Chord network (see Figure ‎6.6). The average query failure 
in this scenario has different results for GON and LON as seen in Figure ‎6.7, which 
we would expect it to have the same results since they use the same setting and 
configuration. This can be explained by knowing the query lookup path. In LON, the 
queries are submitted randomly to any node in the network which makes queries 
travel with equal possibility through any node. While when the query cannot be 
resolved in LON, it is sent to GON through the gateway node. That is, the starting 
node in GON is always the gateway node for all queries, which makes any updates 
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other hands, other nodes have lower probability to update their finger and 
successor tables. This reduces the number of timeouts, but the consequent of un-
updated finger and successor tables is larger failing requests as shown in Figure 
‎6.8. This has been examined by re-simulating the same case but with submitting all 
the queries to only one starting node in LON and the results for all of the three 
measures were the same for GON and LON. 
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Figure ‎6.7: Time out experienced by the lookup during the stabilization scenario for the 
three networks normal Chord, LON and GON in addition to TLP2P total. 
 
Figure ‎6.8: Number of failed requests in 10,000 requests within stabilization scenario for 
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6.2.1.5. Node Blockage 
In this scenario, the path length has a minor effect as the number of blocked 
nodes increases, which can be seen in the two network simulation outputs in Figure 
‎6.9. This is due to nodes at the beginning of the simulation are not aware of the 
blocked nodes, thus nodes' successor lists are not updated with the blocked nodes. 
When a node receives a request, it will try to forward the request to the nodes in its 
successor list assuming they are able to answer the query through the legacy DNS. 
If a node in the successor list is blocked, then it will create another lookup request 
yielding a longer lookup process and affecting the average path length. But over 
time the nodes will know which of the nodes are blocked and will update their 
successor list accordingly. That will reduce the unneeded lookup generated to 
blocked nodes and will reduce the impact on the average path length. 
 For the average load outputs, the difference appears in Chord and GON with 
the increase of blocked nodes, however there is no difference between simulation 
results for LON as seen in Figure ‎6.10. This is due to LON nodes not resolving DNS 
queries and they are utilized for caching only, thus there is no difference for LON in 
case of blockage or not. The average keys per node in this scenario is simply 
dividing the number of unblocked nodes by the number of keys and in the case of 
LON is just dividing the number of LON nodes by the number of keys. For the whole 




Figure ‎6.9: Path length for the case of blocked nodes scenarios for Chord network and 
TLP2P (GON and LON) with uniform requests. 
 
Figure ‎6.10: Average load between nodes for the case of blocked nodes scenarios for Chord 
network, GON and LON with uniform requests. 
6.2.2. Worst Case Scenario with Zipf Distributed Requests 
The normal Chord is re-simulated with Zipf distributed requests. The 
simulation results are almost similar to the uniform distribution except for the load 
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6.2.2.1. Load Balance 
In this scenario, the average load between peers differs from the uniform 
scenario. As stated before, the average load is simply dividing the number of 
requests over the number of nodes and since Zipf distribution has requests 
repetition, it is expected to have a lower load among the peers than the uniform 
distribution. The difference can be seen in Figure ‎6.2 and Figure ‎6.11. So, to predict 
the average number of keys per node for this scenario, the estimate of the number 
of unique requests in Zipf distribution needs to be found first.  
Zipf’s law representing a frequency of elements is:  
          
    
∑  
 
   
 
   
 
 Where k is the element rank, s is the exponent to characterize the distribution, and 
N is the number of elements. As the used distribution in the simulation is pure Zipf, 
then s = 1 and the law can be rewritten as: 
        





   
 
To find the number of unique requests, there will be two steps. First, we need to 
find the rank which will have the frequency of one or more. Second, we need to add 
the rank to the sum of frequencies that are lower than one. 
Step one, finding the rank with frequency of 1 or more: 
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            (solving for k) 
   
 




   
   






   
 
Let     ∑  
 
 
     ⁄ , in other words the elements from 1 to R occur 1 or more 
times. 
Step two, the sum of frequency that is lower than 1 =   ∑            
So, the estimated number of unique requests =      ∑            
Table ‎6-2 lists the predicted and simulated results for normal Chord 
simulation. The difference is small as shown in the last column. The average load 
results for LON and GON are the same, but it is twice as the normal Chord load. 
Likewise LON and GON have close results compared to the predicated values, 
please refer to Table ‎6-3. 
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100000 2.88869976 2.71038 1.78% 
200000 5.55130991 5.21814 1.67% 
300000 8.14197427 7.66918 1.58% 
400000 10.68821262 10.06792 1.55% 
500000 13.20256797 12.46334 1.48% 
600000 15.69215393 14.81138 1.47% 
700000 18.1614886 17.15196 1.44% 
800000 20.61386921 19.4699 1.43% 
900000 23.05152615 21.79372 1.40% 
1000000 25.4763291 24.08972 1.39% 
 
Table ‎6-3: Predicted and simulated average load for LON and GON in the case of Zipf 






Load for LON. 
(LON has same 
results as GON) 
Difference in 
Percentage 
100000 5.77739952 5.41892 1.79% 
200000 11.10261982 10.43836 1.66% 
300000 16.28394854 15.33208 1.59% 
400000 21.37642524 20.14212 1.54% 
500000 26.40513594 24.90532 1.50% 
600000 31.38430786 29.63576 1.46% 
700000 36.3229772 34.29892 1.45% 
800000 41.22773842 38.95204 1.42% 
900000 46.1030523 43.56248 1.41% 





Figure ‎6.11: Average keys per node for normal Chord and TLP2P networks with Zipf 
distributed requests for networks with 10,000 peers. 
6.2.2.2. Path Length 
While the results are the same for normal Chord for the two scenarios, 
uniform and Zipf, it is different for TLP2P simulation. The two overlay networks in 
TLP2P experienced the same query path length, but the difference is the overall 
path length in TLP2P, as seen in Figure ‎6.12. This makes sense as repeated requests 
are resolved in LON while non-cached requests in LON are resolved through GON. 
To predict the path length for TLP2P for this scenario, other calculations need to be 
performed. From last subsection, 
u = number of unique requests =      ∑            
r = number of repeated request = N – unique requests 
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3 1.4116 1.38825 1.65% 
4 2.0802 2.164625 4.06% 
5 2.7305 2.547563 6.70% 
6 3.3659 3.214313 4.50% 
7 3.9887 3.712609 6.92% 
8 4.6005 4.472234 2.79% 
9 5.2033 5.033566 3.26% 
10 5.7981 5.671568 2.18% 
11 6.386 6.240034 2.29% 
12 6.9678 6.836242 1.89% 
13 7.5442 7.367047 2.35% 
14 8.1158 7.905904 2.59% 
Table ‎6-4 lists the predicted values for the path length in TLP2P design and 
the simulation results. It is clear that the values are close to each other and that 
gives a good indication of the validity of the results obtained from the simulator. 
 
Figure ‎6.12: Path length results for normal Chord and TLP2P (50% LON – 50% GON) with 

















Number of Nodes (2x)
Path Length
Pure Chord Zipf 50% Zipf LON 50% Zipf GON TLP2P Total
83 
 
6.2.2.3. Simultaneous Node Failures 
Nodes failing affect the path length of the two designs and it can be noticed 
in the presented Figure ‎6.13 that the two designs have almost the same 
degradation of performance. The two overlay networks in TLP2P are almost 
identical. 
 
Figure ‎6.13: Path length of the two architectures while the networks are experiencing node 
failures. Networks received a Zipf distributed requests. 
6.2.2.4. Lookups during Stabilization 
As expected, the path length is increasing as the rate of joining and leaving 
nodes increases. Also, this is the case for the number of timeouts and failed 
requests as shown in Figure ‎6.14, Figure ‎6.15, and Figure ‎6.16. Unlike the uniform 
scenario, GON is having lower timeout and requests failure than LON, because the 
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LON. Overall, the performance of TLP2P in this scenario is better than the uniform 
scenario. 
 
Figure ‎6.14: Stabilization path length for the two designs normal Chord and TLP2P (50% 
LON – 50% GON) with Zipf distributed requests. 
 
Figure ‎6.15: Lookups’ time out for the stabilization case of the two designs normal Chord 
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Figure ‎6.16: number of failed request’s within 10,000 Zipf distributed requests for the 
stablization case. The plot represents the two designs results normal Chord and TLP2P 
(50% LON – 50% GON). 
6.2.2.5. Node Blockage 
The effect of the blockage nodes on the path length is the same as the case of 
the uniform distribution. Figure ‎6.17 shows small changes in the path length as the 
node blockage increases. However, the utilization of the cache in LON drops the 
average path length, unlike the simulation with uniform distributed request where 
there are no cache hits. Also, the behavior for the average load per node is identical 
to the uniform simulation. The average number of keys per nodes increases as the 
number of blocked nodes increases (see Figure ‎6.18). Again, the number of 
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Figure ‎6.17: Path length, 1st and 99th percentile for Chord network and worst case of TLP2P 
(including GON and LON) with Zipf distributed requests. 
 
Figure ‎6.18: Average keys per node, 1st and 99th percentile for Chord network, GON and 
LON in worst case TLP2P and Zipf distributed requests. 
6.2.3. Best Case Scenario with Zipf Distributed Requests 
The presented graphs in this section for the normal Chord simulation are the 
same as the previous section. The simulation is with Zipf distributed requests. The 
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total number of nodes in TLP2P is the same, but the difference is the distribution of 
the nodes over the two overlay networks. 5% of the total nodes are in LON and the 
rest (95%) are in GON. 
6.2.3.1. Load Balance 
Figure ‎6.19 presents the load distribution of the new rearrangement of 
nodes in TLP2P and the normal Chord. The results in the figure show a slight 
variation between normal Chord and GON network as they are almost having the 
same size. However, they have much lower average load than LON, since its size is 
much smaller than GON and normal Chord networks. 5% of 10,000 nodes is 500 
nodes and that explains the reason behind the large variation. The values can be 
again predicted with the same way used in the previous section (worst case 




Table ‎6-5: Predicted and simulated results of the average load for LON network which is 









100000 57.7739952 54.2032 1.79% 
200000 111.0261982 104.3956 1.66% 
300000 162.8394854 153.2968 1.59% 
400000 213.7642524 201.4952 1.53% 
500000 264.0513594 249.1736 1.49% 
600000 313.8430786 296.23 1.47% 
700000 363.229772 343.0744 1.44% 
800000 412.2773842 389.4624 1.43% 
900000 461.030523 435.7748 1.40% 
1000000 509.526582 481.7204 1.39% 
 
Figure ‎6.19: Average load of Zipf distributed requests simulations for the two design 
normal Chord and TLP2P (5% LON – 95% GON). 
6.2.3.2. Path Length 
For the path length simulations, the network sizes start with a small number 
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which means the LON size for the first case is 0.4 nodes. To correct the size, the 
celling is taken for the calculated percentage to find a logical LON size. Figure ‎6.20 
shows the lookup path length for the two designs and it is 0 for the first two cases 
for LON, this is because there is only one node in LON which is the home node of all 
requests. The path length increases when LON size increases and thus affecting the 
TLP2P total path length. To calculate the predicated path length for this scenario, 
the same equation is applied as the worst case scenario in the previous section. 
Table ‎6-6 shows the predicted as well as simulated path length for all network sizes 
simulated. The results are close and the small variation is expected due to the 
nature of randomness of the queries and nodes hashed value. 










3 0.57777 0.5198 10.03% 
4 0.75563 0.6723375 11.02% 
5 1.3962 1.46398125 4.85% 
6 2.0229 1.917469 5.21% 
7 2.5438 2.299703 9.60% 
8 3.0962 3.041438 1.77% 
9 3.6926 3.480258 5.75% 
10 4.2817 4.02052 6.10% 
11 4.8575 4.694207 3.36% 
12 5.4311 5.147848 5.22% 
13 6.003 5.769342 3.89% 





Figure ‎6.20: Path length for normal Chord and TLP2P (5% LON - 95% GON) with Zipf 
distributed requests. 
6.2.3.3. Simultaneous Node Failures 
The LON network size is 50 for all the simulations in this scenario. From 
Figure ‎6.21, it can be seen that LON is not affected by node failures. The reason 
behind it is that the network is small, which means, in the worst case only 25 nodes 
will fail. In 10,000 requests, this small number of failed node will not make any 
difference to the lookup path length. Moreover, it might reduce slightly the path 
length as noticed in the presented figure, because it will reduce the size of the 
network with negligible effect of failed nodes on the lookups, and the result is a 
lower path length. On the other hand, GON and normal Chord are having a similar 
effect by the node failure, since the network size for both is large and almost the 
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Figure ‎6.21: Path length for Zipf distributed requests to the two designs normal Chord and 
TLP2P (5% LON - 95% GON) after node failure. 
6.2.3.4. Lookups during Stabilization 
All the networks average path lengths are proportionally affected by the 
increase of nodes’ join and departure rate. As seen in Figure ‎6.22, the path length is 
increasing with the instability of the nodes. Also, the timeout is increasing as the 
'join' and 'leave' increases, and the effect on GON is less in this case since it receives 
only non-cached requests (see Figure ‎6.23). In other words, GON receives new 
requests or the caching node in LON lefts without transferring its cache to its 
successor, as explained in Chord paper, resulting in re-fetching the answer from 
GON. LON is having a larger number of failed requests, that is about 8% in the 
worst case, which is illustrated in Figure ‎6.24. Obviously, this is occurring because 
it is a small size network experiencing frequent joining and leaving nodes and the 
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also might have led to inconsistency in the network which caused the large number 
of failing lookups. 
 
Figure ‎6.22: Simulation result of the path length for the two designs normal Chord and 
TLP2P (5% LON - 95% GON) receiving Zipf distributed request. 
 
Figure ‎6.23: Simulation result of the time out for the two designs normal Chord and TLP2P 
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Figure ‎6.24: The results for number of failed lookups out of the 10,000 Zipf distributed 
requests for normal Chord and TLP2P (5% LON - 95% GON). 
6.2.3.5. Node Blockage 
The influence of the node blockage in the best case TLP2P scenario is the 
same as the other blockage cases. Figure ‎6.25 shows slight changes in the path 
length as the node blockage increases, and Figure ‎6.26 shows the average keys per 
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Figure ‎6.25: Path length, 1st and 99th percentile for Chord network and best case of TLP2P 
(including GON and LON) with Zipf distributed requests. 
 
Figure ‎6.26: Average load, 1st and 99th percentile for Chord network, GON and LON in best 
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6.3. Results Comparison 
6.3.1. Load Balance 
The results in the load balance simulation have two indications, i.e., how the 
records are distributed between peers and how the nodes are utilized. The 
distributions of records among the peers for LON, GON, and pure Chord are plotted 
in Figure ‎6.27. The figure only shows the result for the 500,000 Zipf requests case 
with nodes distribution in TLP2P as 5% in LON and 95% in GON. Clearly, the 
number of records stored within peers in LON vary more, and the range is [0, 2000] 
while for the larger networks it is [0, 180]. But more than 80% of nodes are storing 
500 records or less. For the utilization concerns, LON has only 0.64% of nodes with 
no records while it is 7.39% in pure Chord. Also, the results in the figure show that 
LON is more utilized and this is an advantage in TLP2P over the pure Chord. The 
LON size can be increased to meet the requirements whenever the load threshold is 
reached. And, as LON is controlled locally, its size is elastic and it can be scaled up 
or down to satisfy the requirements. The uniform simulation has the same trend as 
the pure Chord and GON, but with fewer nodes having no keys, since all the 





Figure ‎6.27: Number of keys per node simulation for the case of 500,000 Zipf distributed 
requests (a) Presents record distrbution for LON network (5% of TLP2P nodes) (b) 
Presents pure Chord and GON (95% of TLP2P nodes). 
6.3.2. Path Length 
TLP2P in the best scenario has the best results, but TLP2P in worst case 
scenario with uniform requests was having the worst results. In the same scenario, 
but with Zipf requests, TLP2P performed better and the results was close to pure 
Chord. TLP2P is structured to utilize the caching layer, however in the case of 
uniform simulation all requests are unique and no query is resolved from the cache. 
Also, the node distribution between LON and GON meant to increase the path 
length which all of these factors contributed to end up with the highest path length 
in the worst case scenario with uniform requests. In the best case simulation, the 
increase in path length is due to the increase in LON size. If the LON size was fixed 
to a low number of nodes, then the path length will even be better than the results 
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Figure ‎6.28: Average path length for the simulated scenario. 
6.3.3. Simultaneous Node Failures 
As in the previous measures, TLP2P in the best case simulation has the best 
path length in the node failure scenario. Also, unlike the other designs and settings, 
the effect on path length with the increase in the node failure is minor. TLP2P in the 
worst case scenario with Zipf requests is similar to normal Chord, while the same 
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Figure ‎6.29: Average path length for node failure scenario. 
6.3.4. Lookups during Stabilization 
TLP2P in the best case simulation experienced network inconsistency as 
discussed in the last section. Even though it has the lowest path length, the pure 
Chord performed better in this scenario. This is because it has the lowest number of 
lookup failures and lower timeout compared to TLP2P results. TLP2P also has good 
results in term of path length, timeout, and lookup failures when receiving Zipf 
requests in the worst case scenario. But in the uniform request distribution 
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Figure ‎6.30: Average path length for stabilization scenario. 
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Figure ‎6.32: Average number of lookup failures for stabilization scenario. 
6.3.5. Node Blockage 
The results obtained for the three blockage scenarios show small changes in 
the path length as an effect of the increase in the number of blocked nodes (see 
Figure ‎6.33). The reason behind the increase is because nodes’ successor lists at the 
start of the simulation are not updated with blocked nodes which lead into more 
lookups. Overall, the increase in the path length is not large, please refer to section 
‎6.2.1.5 for more explanation of this behavior. In general, the results give a good 
indication of the effectiveness of the solution as the increase in path length is minor 
besides the number of timeouts and request failures are zeros. For the loads on the 
peers, LON has no impact as the nodes get blocked. However, Chord and GON has 
almost the same performance in the best case TLP2P scenario (see Figure ‎6.34). But 
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Stabilization Lookup Failures
Uniform Pure Chord Uniform TLP2P (50% LON - 50% GON)
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Zipf TLP2P (5% LON - 95% GON)
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keys stored in Chord nodes. This is due to the simulation configuration which 
indicates 50% of TLP2P nodes are in GON and that is half Chord network size. So, 
the number of resolver nodes is different between the two networks which results 
in more loads in GON than Chord, but if the number of resolver nodes was the same 
in both networks then they will end up with the same average load. 
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Figure ‎6.34: Number of keys stored per node in the case of node blockage simulation for 
the case of 50% of nodes are blocked with Zipf distributed requests (a) Presents record 
distrbution for LON network (5% of TLP2P nodes) (b) Presents pure Chord and GON (95% 
of TLP2P nodes) 
Overall, TLP2P has the best performance when LON was of small size to 
satisfy the requirements while being fully utilized. This is a logical view as LON will 
be locally controlled and elastic based on the goals to be achieved. If each of these 
simulated scenarios were considered as a real scenario being faced, then LON can 
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CHAPTER 7  
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION 
7.1. Conclusion 
In this thesis, three types of solutions have been presented to mitigate or 
prevent the DoS attack targeting the DNS system. One of the discussed solutions 
proposes a new DNS structure (Dynamic Round-Robin P2P) as a countermeasure to 
the control of root DNS servers by United States Department of Commerce (USDC). 
However, in this thesis, the proposed design (TLP2P) overcomes the dis-efficiencies 
and limitations that exist in the Dynamic Round-Robin P2P system. For example, 
query resolution is not optimized by utilizing the cached answers which implies 
large dependency on the legacy DNS system. Also, the authoritative domain name 
server within a blocked region cannot publish hostnames to be served by Dynamic 
Round-Robin P2P system. The analyzed simulation results showed that TLP2P has 
less dependency on the legacy DNS system by utilizing the cached responses. Also, 
the theoretical analysis and simulation results have proven that TLP2P resolved the 
blockage problem with enhanced performance in terms of path length, even in 
unstable networks. TLP2P has other advantages too, like its dynamic structure 
where the local overlay network can be adjusted online to attain user satisfaction 
while the global overlay network is automated and uncontrolled by an owner. Also, 
better load balance can be achieved by introducing virtual nodes into the system. 
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Finally, this solution can be extended by implementing other advanced layers, like 
record duplication and query prioritization that will be used to enhance the 
performance. 
7.2. Future Work 
The future work improvements will look into the following three aspects: 
reduce the path length, balance the load between nodes, and countermeasure 
malicious peers. For the first two aspects, there have already been solutions 
presented in this thesis and they just need to be implemented in the current design 
to validate the added values. For malicious peers, further investigation and 
research need to be done to find the threats raised by such peers and how to tackle 
them. 
To enhance the simulation, the simulator should account for the cached 
records expiration. Each record should have a Time-To-Live (TTL) value, and 
records should become obsolete when their expiration time is reached. Expired 
records need to be updated based on the update mechanism as discussed in TLP2P 
design. Also, query latency should be considered to measure the overall resolution 
time. Moreover, the solution should be simulated with malicious peers to have a 
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